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I. INTRODUCTION
Welcome to the 2009 edition of the NASA Range Safety Annual Report. Funded by NASA
Headquarters, this report provides a NASA Range Safety overview for current and potential
range users. This year, NASA Range Safety transitioned to a condensed annual report to allow
for Secretariat support to the Range Safety Group, Risk Committee. In the future, traditional
annual reports will be written in even years and condensed versions will be written in odd years.
Although much shorter than in previous years, this report contains full-length articles concerning
various subject areas, as well as links to past reports. Additionally, summaries from various
NASA Range Safety Program activities that took place throughout the year are presented, as
well as information on several projects that may have a profound impact on the way business
will be done in the future.
The sections include a program overview and 2009 highlights; Range Safety Training; Range
Safety Policy; Independent Assessments Support to Program Operations at all ranges
conducting NASA launch operations; a continuing overview of emerging range safety-related
technologies; and status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety
responsibilities.
As is the case each year, contributors to this report are too numerous to mention, but we thank
individuals from the NASA Centers, the Department of Defense, and civilian organizations for
their contributions. We've made a great effort to include the most current information available.
We recommend this report be used only for guidance and that the validity and accuracy of all
articles be verified for updates.
Once again we have utilized this web-based format for the annual report. We continually
receive positive feedback on the web-based edition, and we hope you enjoy this year's product
as well.
It has been a very busy and productive year, as hopefully you will note following a review of this
year's report. Thank you to everyone who contributed to make this year a successful one, and I
look forward to working with all of you in the years to come.
Richard W. Lamoreaux
NASA Range Safety Manager
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II. AGENCY RANGE SAFETY PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND 2009
HIGHLIGHTS
2009 continued the fevered pace of previous years in Range Safety. Before highlighting the
areas covered in this year's edition, it's important to restate the goal of the NASA Range Safety
Program. The program is defined in NPR 8715.5, dated 8 July 2005, and is signed by the
NASA Administrator. The goal of the program is to protect the public, the workforce, and
property during range operations such as launching, flying, landing, and testing launch/flight
vehicles. This goal applies to all centers and test facilities and all NASA vehicle programs
including expendable launch vehicles, reusable launch vehicles, unmanned aerial systems, the
. Space Shuttle, and the Constellation Program. Also included in this group are NASA-funded
commercial ventures that involve range operations. We meet the goal of NPR 8715.5 by
evaluating, mitigating, and controlling the hazards associated with range operations such as
debris, distant focusing overpressure, and toxics. With that in mind, we continued our revision
effort of the NPR, identifying areas that needed updating and suggesting additions to strengthen
the policy arm of NASA Range Safety as well as focusing on common standards between
NASA, 000, and the FAA.
This is our fourth year providing the annual report via a web-based format, which continues to
evolve. This year we continue our approach to updating articles; instead of repeating standard
article information, we only include updates and provide links back to the original articles. We
believe this provides a more user-friendly format. Additionally, we transitioned to a mini-annual
report for odd years, maintaining a full annual report for even years. It takes a herculean effort
each year to publish the annual report, and this transition allows us to provide additional support
in other areas, such as the Range Commanders' Council during odd years. Several areas of
Range Safety will be covered that demonstrate how we meet or implement the Range Safety
Program. A primary focus is training and our continuing efforts regarding the NASA Range
Safety Training Program.
We remain extremely busy in the development, implementation, and support of Range Safety
policy. The Constellation Program took center stage this year with the successful test flight of
the Ares I-X launch vehicle. The launch was a culmination of more than three years of
cooperative effort between representatives from many NASA centers, contractors, and the 45th
Space Wing. Additionally, we supported a number of Space Shuttle and Expendable Launch
Vehicle launches this year, as well as working updated agreements with our partners at the
Eastern and Western Ranges.
NASA Range Safety personnel continue to support the Range Commander's Council meetings
and have been involved in updating policy related to flight safety systems and flight safety risk
criteria. A summary of these efforts is highlighted in this report. Additionally, we continue to
support HQ-sponsored Infrastructure, Facilities, and Operations (IFO) Audits, and we provide a
synopsis of the inspection conducted at Langley Research Center. We also address launch
operations at KSC and the Eastern and Western Range.
Emerging range safety technology continues to interest many in the Range Safety community.
This year we focused on the Autonomous Flight Safety Systems.
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As always, we will conclude with Range Safety reports from the NASA centers that were
actively involved with Range Safety issues throughout the year. Figure 1 gives a brief overview
of the major topics contained in this report.
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FIGURE 1: 2010 RANGE SAFETY REPORT OVERVIEW
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A. Range Safety Training 2009 Updates
Link to 2008 Agency Range Safety Training article
To date, we have conducted 21 Range Safety Orientation Courses with a total of 562 students.
7 Flight Safety Analysis Courses were presented to a total of 127 students, 7 Flight Safety
Systems Course were presented to a total of 105 students, and 4 Range Safety Operations
Course were presented to a total of 24 students. The schedule for all courses for 2010 is
depicted in Figure 2 below.
FIGURE 2: 2010 COURSE SCHEDULE
1. Range Safety Orientation (SMA-SAFE-NSTC-0074)
The Range Safety Orientation Course, as outlined in Figure 3, is designed to provide an
understanding of the Range Safety mission, associated policies and requirements, and NASA
roles and responsibilities. It introduces the students to the major ranges and their capabilities,
defines and discusses the major elements of Range Safety (flight analysis, flight termination
systems, and range operations), and briefly addresses associated range safety topics such as
ground safety, frequency management, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The course
emphasizes the principles of safety risk management to ensure the public and NASA/range
workforces are not subjected to risk of injury greater than that of normal day-to-day activities.
The course is designed to inform the audience of the services offered by the Range Safety
organization, to present timeframes that allow adequate interface with Range Safety during
Program/Project startup and design in an effort to minimize potential delays and costs, and to
recommend ways of making the working relationship with Range Safety beneficial for the Range
User. This course includes a visit to Range Safety facilities at CCAFS/KSC and will normally
only be presented at the Eastern Range. If you wish to discuss presenting the class at your
location, please contact the NSTC staff.
9
Target Audience:
• Senior, program, and project managers
• Safety, Reliability, Quality, and Maintainability Professionals with an interest in Range Safety
activities
FIGURE 3: ORIENTATION COURSE OUTLINE
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2. Range Flight Safety Analysis (SMA-SAFE-NSTC-0086)
The Range Flight Safety Analysis course is designed to give the student a detailed
understanding of range safety analysis. As detailed in Figure 4, the course includes NASA,
FAA, and 000 requirements for flight safety analysis; a discussion of range operation hazards,
risk criteria, and risk management processes; and an in-depth coverage of the containment and
risk management analyses performed for expendable launch vehicles (ELV) at the Eastern
Range.
Although the course is based on ELVs at the Eastern Range, the overall analysis process and
concepts are also applicable to other vehicles and other ranges. The course concentrates on
debris hazards and analyses but also includes an overview of toxic, blast, and radiation risks
and analyses. The course includes class exercises that cover certain aspects of the flight
analysis process.
Prerequisite: Prior attendance at NSTC Course 074, Range Safety Orientation, or equivalent
experience.
Tarqet Audience:
• NASA, FAA, and 000 Range Safety Analysts
• Range Safety personnel in other disciplines
• Program/project managers and engineers who design potentially hazardous systems to
operate on a range
11
FIGURE 4: RANGE FLIGHT SAFETY ANALYSIS COURSE OUTLINE
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3. Range Flight Safety Systems (SMA-SAFE-NSTC-0096)
The Flight Safety Systems (FSS) Course describes FSS responsibilities and Flight Termination
System (FTS) design, test, performance, implementation, analysis, and documentation
requirements. As detailed in Figure 5, the course also includes a review of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) flight termination systems, balloon universal termination packages, and the
Enhanced Flight Termination System (EFTS). The FSS class will conclude with a description of
the Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) and a tour of the Naval Ordnance Test Unit
(NOTU) facilities when the class is held at Kennedy Space Center.
Prerequisites:
1. Completion of NSTC 074, Range Safety Orientation, or equivalent level of experience, or
training, is required
2. Completion of NSTC 002, System Safety Fundamentals, or NSTC 008, System Safety
Workshop, is recommended
Tarqet Audience:
• NASA, FAA, and DoD Range Safety Personnel working Flight Safety Systems issues
• Range Safety personnel in other disciplines
• Program/project managers and engineers who design potentially hazardous systems to
operate on a range
• Personnel who conduct hazardous operations on a range
13
FIGURE 5: RANGE FLIGHT SAFETY SYSTEMS COURSE OUTLINE
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4. Range Safety Operations Course (SMA-SAFE-NSTC-0097)
To ensure mission success and safe operations for the Range, a formal process has evolved
within the Range community to provide Range Safety operations. This course addresses the
roles and responsibilities of the Range Safety Officer for Range Safety operations as well as
real-time support, including pre-launch, launch, flight, re-entry, landing, and any associated
mitigation. Mission rules, countdown activities, and display techniques are presented.
Additionally, tracking, telemetry, and vehicle characteristics are covered in detail. Finally, post
operations, lessons learned, and the use and importance of contingency plans are presented.
Those participating in the course receive hands~on training and exercises to reinforce the
instruction. It is important to note- that this course is only presented at WFF (Wallops Flight
Facility) and is limited to six participants. The course centers on the topics shown in Figure 6
below.
Prerequisites:
1. NSTC course 074, Range Safety Orientation, or equivalent experience and/or training, and
a background in range safety.
2. NSTC-0086, Range Flight Safety Analysis, or equivalent experience and/or training.
3. NSTC-0096, Flight Safety Systems, or equivalent experience and/or training.
Tarqet Audience:
Persons identified as needing initial training for future/current job as RSO with NASA or RSO
management.
Although not being offered through NSTC this year due to restricted funding resources, centers
or other organizations may request this class if funding is provided.
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FIGURE 6: RANGE SAFETY OPERATIONS COURSE
If you wish to attend any of the courses offered, please contact your Center training manager, or
refer to the NSTC web site course catalogue located at:
https://satern.nasa.gov/elms/learner/catalog/
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B. Development, Implementation, Support of Range Safety Policy
1. Range Safety Launch Support Policy
In 2009, NASA Range Safety continued to revise NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8715.5,
Range Safety Policy, working toward a July 2010 posting. One of the primary update areas is
the transition from the currently published acceptable risk criteria to the Range Commanders
Council recommended aggregate risk criteria. A great deal of work is also being done
concerning Uninhabited Aerial Systems guidelines and criteria. Additionally, the need for
Programs to have a formal Range Safety Risk Management Plan may be adjusted to allow them
to identify how risk is managed and implemented in other Program plans and documentation.
Along with these updates, there will be numerous administrative changes that have been
identified since the signing of NPR 8715.5 in 2005.
NRS rolled the information in KSC-PLN-2804, KSC Range Safety landing Implementation Plan
for Space Shuttle, into the existing KSC-PLN-2805, KSC Risk Management for Launch and
Landing of the Space Shuttle. This allowed for the consolidation of both documents into a
single document which also contained updated acceptable risk criteria for CY 2009 due to the
Ares I-X launch from KSC.
We also coordinated a review of our current MOA with the 45 SW, which was scheduled for its
triennial review in February 2009. During this review process, we jointly determine the
applicability of each piece of the agreement and made updates and/or deletions that were
necessary. Review of this document will continue into early CY 2010. Our initial Range Safety
MOA with the 30 SW is still being coordinated through Vandenberg Air Force Base leadership.
We expect this MOA to be signed soon.
We were also very active in development and implementation of tailored requirements for the
Constellation Program for both Ares I-X and Ares I. Throughout 2010, we will continue to focus
on joint tailoring for Ares I as required, allowing shared responsibility of range safety
requirements as described in AFSPCMAN 91-710 and NPR 8715.5.
For more background and information on Range Safety Launch Support Policy, click here.
2. Range Safety Interface
For more background and information on the Range Commanders Council and the Range
Safety Group click here.
a. Range Commanders Council Range Safety Group Recap
The Range Commanders Council (RCC) was founded in 1951 to provide a way for DoD test
ranges to communicate and discuss common problems affecting all parties. Prior to 2008,
NASA was an Associate Member of the RCC with representatives on 6 of the 14 RCC working
groups. NASA became an official voting member in July 2008.
The RCC Range Safety Group (RSG) continues to provide a forum in which ranges can
standardize, develop, and improve on a variety of subjects and processes related to range
safety. Range Safety representatives from NASA HO, KSC, DFRC, and Wallops actively
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support the RSG and its subcommittees on a regular basis. There were two RSG meetings in
2009, summarized below.
b. 104th Range Safety Group Conference
The 104th RSG conference was hosted by Wallops Flight Facility (WFF), VA, on 14-16 April.
The RSG main committee, Risk Committee (RC), Flight Termination Systems Committee
(FTSC), and Directed Energy Range Safety Committee (DERSC) met.
In the main committee, special presentations were made by Wallops Flight Facility focusing on
their capabilities and the failed Alliant Techsystems (ATK) ALV X- test launch. The latter
presentation included a video of the launch. These presentations were followed by range
reports from each range. The next RSG meeting was scheduled for 3-5 November, 2009 at
China Lake, CA.
Some of the topics discussed in the FTSC included the Enhanced Flight Termination System
(EFTS) program update and status, EFTS receiver testing requirements, updating RCC 319 to
include EFTS requirements, and a Subminiature Flight Safety System (SFSS) update. Special
topics included a Moog Inc. presentation regarding testing requirements for hydraulic actuators
and related systems. Additionally, Mr. Michael Young of NASA DFRC was elected as the new
FTSC chairperson.
During the RC meeting, task leads presented briefings concerning model uncertainty,
conditional risk, asset protection, aircraft risk vulnerability, and a Federal Aviation Administration
proposal focusing on debris catalogs. The RC chair presented a schedule and way ahead for
completion of all tasks prior to the next RSG in November 2009. In addition, NASA Range
Safety volunteered to conduct the secretariat duties during this revision cycle.
c. 10Sth Range Safety Group Conference
The 105th RSG conference was hosted by Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC), China Lake,
California, 2-6 November. The RSG main committee, RC, FTSC, and DERSC met. The next
meeting was scheduled for April 2010 at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
In the RSG main committee, NAWC gave a briefing on their facilities and operations, which
include one of the nation's largest overland test ranges. WFF also gave an in-depth
presentation and discussion on the recent discovery of a boat in a rear marsh within the boat
exclusion area during a launch. These presentations were followed by the standard activity
reports from each range.
Topics discussed in the FTSC were Enhanced Flight Termination System (EFTS)
implementation at various ranges, updating RCC 319 to include EFTS requirements, creating a
new RCC document similar to RCC 313 regarding test methodology of EFTS receivers, NASA
and ATK Autonomous Flight Safety Systems, L-3 Communications electronic safe and arm
device (in-line FTSA), and the L-3 Communications plans for a Subminiature Flight Safety
System (SFSS).
During the RC meeting, the group discussed and voted for inclusion into RCC 321-10 the tasks
that were worked during the year. Those tasks were: Asset Protection, Aircraft Vulnerability
Modeling, Uncertainty Modeling and Catastrophic Risk Aversion, Asset Protection Criteria; and
Conditional Risk. The chair briefed the possible use of an Air Force staff summary package to
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coordinate the updates to the standard within the various organizations. Additionally, the group
approved the proposal of Dr. Paul Wilde of the FAA, as the new chair for the Risk Committee.
His name will be forwarded to the Executive Committee for approval.
c. Range Safety Independent Assessments
NASA headquarters has the responsibility for conducting independent process verification
reviews at NASA centers and ranges to ensure, among other things, the mitigation of
operational, health, and system hazards. Reviews also include compliance with laws, executive
orders, publications and standards, local operating procedures, and special interest items that
.pertain to the center or range.
In response to this requirement, the NASA Range Safety Manager participated in one
independent assessment in 2009 at Langley Research Center (LaRC).
Findings are categorized as follows:
• Observation - a condition not contrary to documented requirements but warrants
improvement or clarification
• Non-Compliance - failure to comply with documented requirements
• Commendation - a process that is performed extraordinarily well or that would provide
significant benefit to other centers or ranges
The assessment was an Institutional/Facility/Operational (IFO) safety audit at Langley Research
Center, conducted from in July, 2009.
1. Purpose
In response to an April 2009 Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel (IAOP) finding regarding
LaRC UAS flight operations and the need to satisfy requirements of NPR 8715.5, NASA Range
Safety Program, the NASA Range Safety Team performed the following:
• Reviewed LaRC UAS operations and identified the scope of range safety activities needed
to comply with Agency policy.
• Used fact-based observations as a basis for comments about compliance with range safety
requirements.
• Initiated an exchange of information that will help LaRC to establish Center range safety
processes appropriate to it needs.
• Interpreted and complied with the Agency range safety requirements.
• Provided suggestions on how to prepare and implement required procedures and plans.
• Ensured safe flight operations.
• Identified training, tools, and other assistance that the NASA Range Safety Program can
provide LaRC.
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2. Recommendation
NASA Range Safety submits the following Recommendations/Positive Observation:
• The Center should develop an oversight position, "independent" of UAS Projects to ensure
the requirements and policies of NASA's range safety program (NPR 8715.5, Range Safety
Policy) are implemented.
• The Center should ensure that appropriate Range Safety Risk Management Plan (RSRMP)
requirements are documented for UAS operations.
- Casualty Expectations (Ec).
- Risk Mitigation.
- FAA Certificate of Authorization Compliance.
3. Positive Observations
• All UAS projects are receiving a thorough review and approval to fly through the LaRC
Airworthiness and Safety Review Board (ASRB).
• Research Services Directorate (RSD) is very proactive in ensuring safe UAS operations.
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III. RANGE SAFETY SUPPORT TO PROGRAM OPERATIONS
NASA and KSC Range Safety supported 19 launches this year: 4 from the Western Range and
15 from the Eastern Range (3 NASA sponsored expendable launch vehicle launches, 6 non-
NASA launches in the Risk Assessment Center, 5 Shuttle launches, and the Ares I-X test
launch).
In order to ensure the requirements of NPR 8715.5 are met during pre-launch, launch, and post-
launch operations, NRS personnel work side by side with our Department of Defense
counterparts in the Eastern or Western Range Operations Control Centers. NRS personnel
ensure any range safety related activities that could have an impact on NASA launch criteria are
relayed to the NASA Safety and Program officials to ensure safe flight and compliance with
requirements identified in NASA Range Safety directives.
We look forward to 2010 and supporting the numerous ELV launches at both the Eastern and
Western Ranges. Additionally, we anticipate supporting five Shuttle missions.
Click here to view 2008 article.
EASTERN AND WESTERN RANGE
Mission Vehicle Launch Site Launch Date Responsible Org
NROL-25 Delta IV-H CCAFS 1/17-18/09 DoD
NOAA-N Prime Delta II VAFB 2/6/2009 DoD
OCO Taurus XL VAFB 2/24/2009 DoD
Kepler Delta \I CCAFS 3/6-7/09 DoD
ISS 15A STS 119 KSC 3/15/2009 NASA
GPS 2R-20 (M7) Delta II CCAFS 3/24/2009 DoD
WGS 2 Atlas V CCAFS 4/3-4/09 DoD
STSS-ATRR Delta \I VAFB 5/5/2009 DoD
HST Servicing STS 125 KSC 5/11/2009 NASA
LRO Atlas V CCAFS 6/18/2009 DoD
GOES Delta IV CCAFS 6/27/2009 DoD
ISS 2J/A STS 127 KSC 7/15/2009 NASA
GPS IIR-21 Delta II CCAFS 8/17/2009 DoD
ISS 17A STS-128 KSC 8/28-29/09 NASA
PAN Atlas V CCAFS 9/8/2009 DoD
STSS Demo Delta II CCAFS 9/25/2009 DoD
Worldview 2 Delta II VAFB 10/8/2009 DoD
DMSP F18 Atlas V VAFB 10/18/2009 DoD
Test Flight Ares 1-X KSC 10/28/2009 NASA
ISS ULF 3 STS 129 KSC 11/16/2009 NASA
Intelsat 14 Atlas V CCAFS 11/23/2009 DoD
WGS3 Delta IV CCAFS 12/5-6/2009 DoD
WISE Delta II VAFB 12/14/2009 NASA
FIGURE 7: EASTERN AND WESTERN RANGE MISSIONS 2009
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F ________=Dryden Flight Research Center Missions 2009r'- T
I Date
101121109
101128109
101130109
102104109
102110109
102115109
103105109
103105109
103118109
104102109
106104109
106117109
106118109
106123109
107/08/09
107/10/09
107/11109
107/15/09
107/17109
107121109
107/30/09
108111109
108/18/09
108/18/09
108/20109
108/27/09
109/01/09
109/01/09
109/03109
109/03109
109/10109
109/11109
109/15109
109/17/09
109/23109
109/29/09
110106/09
110/08/09
110/15/09
110121/09
110123109
110129/09
111/04/09
111/09/09
111/18/09
111/19/09
112102109
Project Name
X-48B lSV (Blended Wing Body)
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
11mana (NASA Predator B)
Ikhana
Ikhana
Ikhana
Ikhana
Ikhana
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
Ikhana
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
Ikhana
Ikhana
X-48B lSV
Ikhana
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
Ikhana
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
X-48B lSV
Ikhana
X-48B lSV
NASA Global Hawk
NASA Global Hawk
NASA Global Hawk
NASA Global Hawk
Ikhana
Ikhana
X-48B lSV
Mission
Flight # 40
Flight # 41
Flight # 42
Flight # 43
Flight # 44
Flight # 45
Flight # 46
Flight # 47
Flight # 48 and Flight # 49
Flight # 50
Flight # 51
Flight # 75; Functional Check Flight
Flight # 76; Functional Check Flight
Flight # 77; Functional Check Flight
Flight # 78; Acoustic Research Dry Run
Flight # 79; Acoustic Research
Flight # 80; Acoustic Research
Flight # 52
Flight # 53
Flight # 54
Flight # 55
Flight # 56
Flight # 81; Pilot Proficiency Flight
Flight # 57
Flight # 58
Flight # 82; Pilot Proficiency Flight
Flight # 83; Pilot Proficiency Flight
Flight # 59 and Flight # 60
Flight # 84; Pilot Proficiency Flight
Flight#61
Flight # 62 and Flight # 63
Flight # 85; Pilot Proficiency Flight
Flight#64
Flight #65
Flight#66
Flight#67
Flight#68
Flight # 69
Flight # 86; Pilot Proficiency Flight
Right # 70
Right # 1 (1 st NASA Flight)
Flight # 2
Flight # 3; Pilot Proficiency Flight
Flight # 4 and Flight # 5; Pilot Proficiency
Right # 87; functional Check Flight
Flight # 88;'Post Survey of Station Fire
Right # 71 and Flight # 72
Location
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
Em'Vards AFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
Em'Vards AFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
EdwardsAFB
Em'Vards AFB
Em'Vards AFB
EdwardsAFB
Edwards AFB; R·
Edwards AFB; R·
Edwards AFB; R·
Em'lards AFB
Em'Vards AFB
Em-lards AFB
Mission Result
Success
Success
Eartv RTB'
Success
Success
Success
Success
Eartv RTB2
Success
RTB'
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Eartv RTB4
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
f:------'-----------".--l.------.-----~----.........I-----__!i
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FIGURE 8: DRYDEN FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER MISSIONS 2009
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lAUNCH
DATE VEHICLE ACRONYM LOCATION RESULT
1/10/2009 Orion 30.073 UO ISIS (Ionospheric Science and Inertial Sensing) Poker Flat Research Range, AI< S
1/29/2009 Black Brant IX 36.242 UE ACES-High (Aurora Current and Electrodynamics Structure) Poker Flat Research Range, AI< S
1/29/2009 Black Brant VB 21.139 UE ACES-Low (Aurora Current and Electrodvnamics Structure) Poker Flat Research Range, AI< S
2118/2009 Terrier Orion 41.076 UE Generation and Development of Turbulence in the 100-km Poker Flat Research Range, AI< S
2118/2009 Terrier Orion 41.077 UE Generation and Development of Turbulence in the 100-km Poker Flat Research Ranae, AI< S
2/18/2009 Terrier Orion 41.078 UE Generation and Development of Turbulence in the 100-km Poker Flat Research Range, AI< S
2118/2009 Terrier Orion 41.079 UE Generation and Development of Turbulence in the 100-km Poker Flat Research Range, AI< S
2125/2009 Terrier Black Brant 36.226 UG CIBER (Cosmic Infrared Backaround ExpeRiment) White Sands Missile Ranae, NM S
3/20/2009 Black Brant XII 40.023 UE Analyses of Dynamic Electron precipitation Structures) Poker Flat Research Range, AI< S
5/19/2009 TacSat-3 Minotaur 1 Wallops Island, VA S
5/28/2009 Terrier Mk-12-lmproved Orion 41.080 UO SOAREX (Sub-Orbital Aerodvnamic Re-entry EXoeriments) Wallops Island, VA S
6/25/2009 Terrier Mk-12-lmproved Orion 41.083 UO University level rocket flight training workshop know as RockOn Wallops Island, VA S
6/27/2009 Terrier Black Brant 36.244 UG DICE (Diffuse Interstellar Cloud Experiment) Wallops Island, VA S
7/8/2009 Max Launch Abort System MLAS WAllops Island, VA S
8/10/2009 36.229 DR MARTI (Missile Alternative Range Target Instrument) San Nicolas Island S
8/17/2009 Terrier Black Brant 36.254 NR IRVE II (Inflatable Reentry Vehicle Experiment /I) Wallops Island, VA S
9/14/2009 Black Brant IX 36.221 OS HELiosphere) White Sands Missile Range, NM S
9/19/2009 Black Brant XI 39.009 DR CARE (Charged Dust Release Experiment) Wallops Island, VA S
11/14/2009 Black Brant IX 36.252 UH CvXESS-1i (Cvanus X-ray Emission Spectroscopic Survey II) White Sands Missile Range, NM S
2009 Balloon Launches
5/5/2009 0.8 MCM Balloon Musserllndiana Unv Ft. Sumner, NM S
5/1712009 1.12 MCM Balloon Boggs/Unv CA Ft. Sumner, NM S
5/2112009 1.12 MCM Balloon Clem/Univ Delaware Esranae/Sweden S
6/6/2009 1.12 MCM Balloon Clem/Univ Delaware Esrange/Sweden S
6/8/2009 0.97 MCM Balloon Solanski/Max Inst Esrange/Sweden S
6/8/2009 1.12 MCM Balloon MartinlCal Tech Ft. Sumner, NM S
6/11/2009 0.97 MCM Balloon Hananv/Univ Minn Ft. Sumner, NM S
6/2212009 .40 MCM BalioonPiercelWFF Esrange/Sweden TEST FLT
9/11/2009 11.8 MCM Balloon GuziklLSU Ft. Sumner, NM S
9/19/2009 1.12 MCM Balloon FairbrotherlWFF Ft. Sumner, NM TEST FLT
FIGURE 9: WALLOPS FLIGHT FACILITY MISSIONS 2009
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IV. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
A. Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS)
The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is a joint Kennedy Space Center and Wallops
Flight Facility (WFF) project intended for use as an independent and autonomous flight
termination subsystem for expendable launch vehicles. It uses tracking and attitude data from
onboard Global Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) sensors and
configurable rule-based algorithms to make flight termination decisions. The objectives of the
AFSS are to increase capabilities by allowing launches from locations that do not have existing
range safety infrastructure, to reduce costs by eliminating downrange tracking and
communications assets, and to reduce the reaction time for flight termination decisions.
AFSS will have its third rocket flight in January 2010. A loosely coupled GPSIINS Kalman-
filtered navigation solution will be tested, and an improved ground support computer will be
used to input configuration files and initialize the system in addition to other specific
improvements mentioned in last year's report.
The system requirements are being finalized and the proof-of-code is beginning the formal
review process where each code module will be reviewed and tested.
The biggest change this year has been the decree by Air Force Space Command that all Air
Force ranges will use an autonomous flight safety system by 2018 (although not necessarily the
NASA system). The NASA AFSS team is an integral member of the Air Force Community of
Interest on converting the ranges to an autonomous flight safety system and has briefed at
many meetings. The NASA AFSS team believes the best way to implement an autonomous
flight safety system on all ranges is to have one set of carefully controlled, government-
furnished software (hopefully based on the NASA software) run with user-supplied configuration
files so that the software only needs to be vetted once before being accepted for use on multiple
ranges. This idea is gaining momentum, and the NASA AFSS team will certainly play an
important role in the process.
B. VAB Hazard Analyses for Constellation Processing
As reported last year (see 2008 Article), the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) must be re-sited,
from an explosive safety perspective, to support hazardous operations for the Constellation
Program. The current Quantity-Distance (QD) Safe Siting radius for Shuttle processing is based
on having no more than 16 Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) segments present at one
time. Plans for Constellation processing may require 40 or more RSRM segments since the
Ares I first stage is expected to consist of 5 segments and Ares V boosters may contain 5 %
segments each. In addition to these potentially explosive components, the Orion Service
Module could also be present in the VAB, which may contain a full load of hypergolic liquid
propellants, possibly in excess of 19,000 pounds [35% Monomethyl Hydrazine (MMH), and
65% Nitrogen Tetroxide (NTO)]. Since this collection of dangerous commodities presents a
variety of hazards to personnel and surrounding facilities, a study was initiated in 2007 to
evaluate and document the Maximum Credible Event (MCE) that could be expected from
simultaneous vehicle processing in the VAB.
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Since mid-2008, the KSC Safety & Mission Assurance Integration Office (KSC/SA-G) has led
the overall MCE effort, and KSC Range Safety personnel have played a support role, along with
a large team of contributors that was assembled to pursue various portions of this complex
endeavor. There has been collaboration and close coordination with Explosive Safety leaders
at KSC and HQ-NASA, as well. Early this year, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center
(NESC) wrapped up a thermal hazard study based on two five-segment solid motors burning in
one VAS high bay. To ensure a worst case result, motors were assumed stationary with no
structural failure. Work on this bounding case was shared by Ames Research Center (ARC),
where Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) analyses continue to playa role in ongoing
investigations. Also involved were the Navy's China Lake research facility, where thermal
radiation analysis was conducted; Hughes Associates, Inc., where human burn injury modeling
was performed; ATK Space Systems, who manufactures the RSRM segments and other solid
motor hardware; and the KSC Engineering Design & Development Office (KSC/ NE-D), which
provided focused technical and project management services. A detailed analysis of exhaust
gas convection, radiation, and through-the-case conduction indicated that assembled solid
motors in other high bays would likely not be ignited due to thermal transport from the burning
motor pair. As a result, the largest hazard radius due to thermal radiation beyond a rising
exhaust plume was estimated to be slightly smaller than the existing Shuttle QD arc (1310 feet).
Traditional QD Siting, implemented using table lookup against a total weight of potentially
explosive material, is intended to account for general blast and fragmentation hazards, as well
as thermal effects associated with a fireball. More specific hazards to be considered under the
MCE approach include acoustic energy and toxic materials in and around the VAS (commonly
referred to as "near-field" toxic hazards).
In addition to the safe siting activity, which establishes a logistical control boundary, NASA
regulations also require that all potential hazards be investigated to determine if reasonable
mitigations are warranted. Additional hazards to be reviewed under an Integrated Hazard
Assessment (IHA) include structural failures and possible collapse, propulsive components that
could break free of restraints, and toxic clouds that could be transported by the wind and settle
to the ground at considerable distances from the VAS (commonly referred to as "far-field" toxic
hazards).
Figure 10, below, attempts to illustrate this array of relevant hazards and their relationships to
QD, MCE, IHA, and NPR 8715.3C (NASA General Safety Program Requirements, Change 3).
Note that hazards inside the VAS (right half of diagram) have been distinguished from hazards
outside (left half of diagram) since the circumstances and corresponding analysis methods often
differ. Also, propulsive hazards outside the VAS are shown in a lighter shade because they
may eventually be analyzed and documented separate from the primary IHA.
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FIGURE 10: VAS HAZARD ANALYSIS CATEGORIES
By mid-2009, the Ares V booster configuration had changed from 5 to 5 ~ RSRM segments,
and the KSC team decided to assume two 4 ~-segment open stacks burning while anchored in
one high bay. Previous thermal analyses were performed assuming stationary 5-segment
capped motors for worst-case estimation purposes. The more credible events were determined
to involve inadvertent ignition of, at most, two uncapped stacks since they would generate
limited propulsive forces. Consideration will be given to ignition propagation between boosters
within a single bay and potential spreading to other bays within the VAB. Several other ignition
cases will be considered which would involve lesser amounts of propellant within a bay or at
other locations, such as the Transfer Aisle. CFD analyses were resumed at ARC with an initial
emphasis on bay-to-bay ignition propagation.
ATK was asked to examine radiation effects and through-the-case heat transfer as well as
ignition criteria and the likelihood of deflagration when ignition occurs at the outer propellant
interface with the liner and insulation layers. Due to resource limitations at ARC, SAIC was
brought in to perform CFD analyses extending well outside the VAB walls and to evaluate
thermal radiation effects on personnel beyond the rising exhaust plume. Their CFD output will
also be used by ACTA, Inc., an Air Force and NASA Range Safety contractor, to evaluate near-
field and far-field toxic hazards. It is possible that the largest distance to a safe near-field
concentration level could become the driver for MCE purposes.
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ACTA has also performed verification of blast and fragmentation analyses, conducted originally
by Engineering Associates, Inc. (EAI), and managed by the KSC Constellation Project Ground
Systems Office (KSC/ LX-D). EAl's work is largely directed toward the design of hazard
mitigations in the VAB. Such facility upgrades might include the addition of cladding to selected
walls and protective gates (or doors) to enclose hypergol processing cells. Some of EAI's
outputs have also been used to support hazard radius determination. After confirming their
fundamental results, ACTA expanded on the EAI approach and has begun generating
comprehensive estimates of maximum injury distances defined by fragment density and kinetic
energy. Blast hazard radii are generally smaller than fragmentation radii and do not typically
drive the QD arc. It should be noted that ACTA will be applying their expertise in toxics
modeling and using existing Range Safety software to estimate dispersion effects in FY2010.
KSC/NE-D has completed an acoustic hazard analysis that includes both 4 %-segment open
stack and 5 %-segment capped motor cases. An injury criteria for personnel was developed to
establish safe separation distances with an ability to egress being the basis. Any sound levels
above the human ear's threshold of pain (140 dBA) would quickly impede a person's ability to
exit the building safely. At this exposure level, a safe separation distance was found to exceed
a thousand feet, but fall within the current QD arc defined for Shuttle processing. These results
are not expected to significantly influence the MCE outcome, but they do indicate a significant
ear damage hazard to personnel inside the VAB.
Lastly, the KSC Launch Vehicle Processing Constellation Operations Office (KSC/ PH-C) has
been working with ATK and structural simulation experts at ARC to investigate hazards posed
by potentially propulsive components, as well as the failure and possible collapse of structural
elements. How long after an inadvertent ignition would a fully stacked and capped RSRM break
free and begin rising off the Mobile Launch Platform (MLP)? How much speed could it build up
before impacting an overhead crane or the VAB sub-roof? Is there enough kinetic energy and
structural toughness to perforate the roof slab and continue flying outside the building? Could
heat generated by burning motors or partially stacked segments cause the MLP, elevated
structures, or load-bearing beams inside the VAB to fail? These questions and others are being
considered by this team, which includes KSC/NE-D and a KSC Range Safety engineer.
Answers will likely take an additional two or more years to achieve.
c. Joint Advanced Range Safety System (JARSS)
The Joint Advanced Range Safety System (JARRS) is a collaborative effort between Dryden
Flight Research Center and the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base to
develop a state-of-the-art mission planning, risk analysis, and risk management tool for range
safety. The Range Safety organizations from all Major Range and Test Facility Bases are being
asked to support the development, testing, and operation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS)
and reusable launch vehicles (RLV). It is the vision of JARRS to provide range safety support
for these missions.
JARRS consists of two primary elements: a Mission Analysis Software Tool and the Real-Time
Operations Tool.
The Mission Analysis Software Tool will quantify the range safety risk for a given flight path and
its associated vehicle parameters using a computerized method. This method will streamline
the range safety analysis by providing a consistent, high fidelity solution in less time than
required by present methods of analysis.
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The Real-Time Operations Tool will provide the Range Safety Officer with near real-time
assessment of the range safety risks during flight. This capability has many possible
applications to the UAS or RLV operator, including assessment of UAS overflight of populated
areas, allowing extended flight of an anomalous vehicle, recovery of an off-nominal vehicle at an
alternate landing site, or selection of an alternate flight or entry path.
Major accomplishments this year include using JARSS Mission Planning to calculate range
safety risk for the upcoming NASA Global Hawk GloPac 2010 missions near Hawaii and Alaska.
The 30th Space Wing at Vandenberg AFB has funded the development of JARSS Real Time
and is currently in the process of testing the system for possible operational use.
28
v. STATUS REPORTS
A. Kennedy Space Center
The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative is tasked with implementing NASA
policy and keeping the Agency Range Safety Manager informed of all activities related to range
safety. Over the course of the past year, the KSC Range Safety Representative supported a
multitude of range safety activities, ranging from pre-launch policy interpretation and guidance
to providing on-console support during launch campaigns.
1. Constellation Program
The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative participated in many meetings and
technical exchange sessions in support of finalizing a set of tailored range safety requirements
and developing launch support and countdown documentation for the Ares I-X Test Flight
Mission. The Ares I-X Test Flight Mission was successfully launched on 28 October from Space
Launch Complex 39B. The mission was required to meet both Air Force Space Command
Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements, and NASA Procedural
Requirements (NPR) 8715.5, Range Safety Program Requirements. Working through the
Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel (LCRSP), the 45th Space Wing Safety Office,
Constellation Program Office, and NASA Range Safety successfully developed a single joint
tailored document that included all range safety requirements. This unique teaming process
has set a precedent for future Constellation Program range safety requirements tailoring. The
effort also exemplified NASA's philosophy of accepting (or sharing) responsibility for all aspects
of range safety. A draft set of tailored requirements for the Ares 1 Launch Vehicle is underway.
The Range Safety Representative also provided continued support to the LCRSP and
associated Constellation Program working groups.
2. Space Shuttle Program
For the Space Shuttle Program, the KSC Range Safety Representative prepared and issued an
update to the Program's Range Safety Risk Management Plan (RSRMP). The update
combined documents KSC-PLN-2804, Range Safety Landing Implementation Plan for Space
Shutt/e, and KSC-PLN-2805, Range Safety Risk Management Plan for Launch and Landing of
the Space Shuttle. It also updated acceptable criteria for Shuttle ascent to reflect the 2009 flight
of Ares 1-X and clarified how the annual criteria clause of the NPR is implemented for the
Shuttle Program. Population definitions and the facilities considered "Center Essential" for
Shuttle launches were also added.
Launch and entry risk estimates were evaluated for STS-119, STS-125, STS-127, STS-128,
and STS-129, with mitigation efforts initiated through the KSC Emergency Operations Center
when appropriate.
The KSC Range Safety Representative also provided continued support to the Shuttle Range
Safety Panel and supported all the above listed Shuttle launches on console in the Morrell
Operations Center (MOC).
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3. Launch Services Program
The KSC Range Safety Representative supported a number of NASA expendable launch
vehicle campaigns for the Launch Service Program (LSP), including NOAA-N Prime, OCO,
KEPLER, STSS-ATRR, LRO, STSS-DEMO, and WISE. This effort involved attending all the
NASA and Air Force Safety readiness reviews, ensuring NPR requirements were being met,
and identifying, documenting, and obtaining acceptance/approval of any variances during the
respective prelaunch and launch countdowns.
4. Eastern Range Launch Support
In 2009, the KSC Range Safety Representative began providing launch support for non-NASA
Eastern Range missions. Serving as the liaison between the 45th Space Wing Safety Office
Risk Assessment Center and the KSC Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the KSC Range
Safety office evaluated and interpreted range safety risks to KSC personnel and property due to
CCAFS launches and suggested mitigation actions when appropriate. In this capacity, the KSC
Range Safety Representative supported the GOES-O, GPS 2R-21, PAN, INTELSAT 14, and
WGS-3 missions.
5. Agency Activities
The KSC Range Safety Representative served as a NASA point of contact to the Range Safety
Group and supported several committees charged with developing or rewriting nationwide
standards on a number of important range safety issues. These topics included developing
reusable launch vehicle and unmanned aerial vehicle and system requirements, and proposed
requirements for active satellite and cataloged orbital debris Collision Avoidance. The KSC
Range Safety Representative was also active in the development of a proposed policy for the
future use of autonomous flight safety systems within NASA. KSC is closely monitoring the
status and AFSPC-proposed decommissioning of Eastern and Western Range ground tracking
and command assets through their Future Range Architecture Team.
2009 was a challenging year, supporting an increased number of launch and entry campaigns,
providing critical support to the Constellation Program and the launch of the Ares I-X launch
vehicle, continuing to ensure Kennedy Space Center safely implements NASA Range Safety
requirements, and tracking emerging technologies. The coming year promises to be equally
busy, and the Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative will continue to provide
critical support as necessary when called upon by NASA programs or to address issues as they
arise.
B. Wallops Flight facility
The Wallops Safety Office (Code 803) supports all missions at Wallops Flight Facility and
provides support at various other locations around the world as needed. This support includes
ground safety and flight safety analysis, documentation of operational rules, and active support
of ground processing and flight operations. Listed below are various project! programs that the
Safety Office supported in 2009.
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1. TacSat-3
TacSat-3 was successfully launched from Wallops Island on 19 May 2009. TacSat-3 featured
three revolutionary trials: the Raytheon Company-built Advanced Responsive Tactically
Effective Military Imaging Spectrometer hyperspectral imager, the Office of Naval Research's
Satellite Communications Package, and the Air Force Research Laboratory's Space Avionics
Experiment.
FIGURE 11: TACSAT-3
2. Max Launch Abort System (MLAS)
The Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) was successfully tested in a simulated pad abort test at
Wallops Flight Facility on 8 July 2009. The test vehicle weighed over 45,000 pounds and was
over 33 feet tall. The unpiloted launch tested an alternate concept for safely propelling a future
spacecraft and its crew away from a problem on the launch pad or during ascent. The MLAS
consists of four solid rocket abort motors inside a bullet-shaped composite fairing attached to a
full-scale mockup of the crew module.
FIGURE 12: MLAS SIMULATED PAD ABORT TEST
The MLAS vehicle was launched to an altitude of approximately one mile to simulate an
emergency on the launch pad. The flight demonstration began after the four solid rocket motors
burned out. The crew module mockup separated from the launch vehicle at approximately
seven seconds into the flight and parachuted into the Atlantic Ocean.
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3. Sounding Rocket Program
The Sounding Rocket Program conducted 16 missions in 2009 with an overall mission success
rate of 100%.
The Inflatable Re-entry Vehicle Experiment, or IRVE, was vacuum-packed into a 15-inch
diameter payload "shroud" and launched on a small sounding rocket from NASA's Wallops
Flight Facility on August 17, 2009. Nitrogen inflated the 10-foot (3 m) diameter heat shield,
made of several layers of silicone-coated industrial fabric, to a mushroom shape in space
several minutes after liftoff.
FIGURE 13: IRVE
Inflatable heat shields hold promise for future planetary missions, according to researchers. To
land more mass on Mars at higher surface elevations, for instance, mission planners need to
maximize the drag area of the entry system. The larger the diameter of the aeroshell, the bigger
the payload can be.
A.
4. Balloon Program Office
The Balloon Program Office at Wallops Flight Facility conducted 13 missions during fiscal year
2009. Flight operations were conducted from Fort Sumner, New Mexico; McMurdo, Antarctica;
and Kiruna, Sweden in support of Space and Earth science payloads as well as developmental
test flights for new balloon design and balloon film qualification. Flight durations ranged from 4
hours to 54 days with the longest flight occurring over Antarctica on the 7 million cubic foot
volume super pressure test flight. The Balloon Program Office continued the Ultra Long
Duration Balloon (ULDB) vehicle development. Test flights of larger scale designs of the ULDB
super pressure balloon is planned for 2010. The balloon is being developed to provide
extended duration flights upwards of 60-100 days at constant float altitudes. The Balloon
Program plans to conduct remote campaigns from McMurdo, Antarctica; Alice Springs,
Australia; and Fort Sumner, New Mexico.
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FIGURE 14: SUNRISE 1-METER BALLOON TELESCOPE READY FOR LAUNCH,
ESRANGE, JUNE 2009
C. Dryden Flight Research Center
For more background and information on the DFRC Status Report, click here.
The Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC), located at Edwards Air Force Base, California, is
NASA's primary installation for flight research and testing. Over the past 63 years, projects at
Dryden have led to major advancements in the design and capabilities of many civilian and
military aircraft. In the past, DFRC has also conducted tests in support of the Agency's space
programs.
The Center supports operations of the Space Shuttle and development of future access-to-
space vehicles, conducts airborne science missions and flight operations, and develops piloted
and uninhabited aircraft test beds for research and science missions.
Range Safety operations at Dryden are managed by the Range Safety Office (RS Office). The
RS Office was established by the Dryden Center Director under an alliance agreement with the
Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) to provide independent review and oversight of Range
Safety issues. The Office supports the Center by providing trained Flight Termination System
(FTS) engineers, Range Safety risk analysts, and Range Safety Officers to provide mission and
project support for Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Projects. The DFRC/AFFTC range safety
alliance allows both offices to work together, each providing expertise on projects the other
office may not be as familiar with.
The DFRC/AFFTC Range Safety alliance is planning to install and test a fixed Enhanced FTS
(EFTS) transmitter site which will be operational by the end of next calendar year.
Dryden continues to support the testing of a wide range of UASs. The UASs that were flown
with Dryden assistance include:
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1. Small UASs
Small UASs (sUAS) are in the model-type classification of flight vehicles. Dryden has
established an area that offers sUAS projects a unique opportunity to conduct flights within the
restricted airspace. Dryden has also established a streamlined flight approval process for
sUASs that makes the airworthiness and safety review quicker and easier than those performed
for larger UASs. During the last year, Dryden has supported over 270 hours of operations on
multiple platforms from 6 different manufacturers.
2. Blended Wing Body Low Speed Vehicle
The Blended Wing Body (BWB) Low Speed Vehicle (LSV) UAS, also known as X-48B LSV, is a
dynamically scaled version of the original concept vehicle. The X-48B LSV Project is a
partnership between NASA, Boeing, USAF Research Laboratory, and Cranfield Aerospace.
The primary goals of the test and research project are to study the flight and handling
characteristics of the BWB design, match the vehicle's performance with engineering predictions
based on computer and wind tunnel studies, develop and evaluate digital flight control
algorithms, and assess the integration of the propulsion system to the airframe. The BWB
testing will address several key areas that future aeronautical designs will face including noise
reduction, emissions reduction, and improvement in fuel economy. Industry studies suggest
that because of its efficient configuration, the BWB would consume 20% less fuel than the
jetliners of today while cruising at high subsonic speeds on flights of up to 7,000 nautical miles.
To date, the project has conducted 72 successful flights, all conducted with LSV #2.
LSV #1, the wind tunnel vehicle, has been heavily modified to make the vehicle quieter. The
modifications include reducing the number of engines from three to two, the installation of noise-
shielding vertical fins, and the removal of the winglets. The designation for this new
configuration is X-48C. The first flight of this vehicle is expected to occur in late 2010.
3. NASA Global Hawk
Dryden has acqUired two former United States Air Force (USAF) Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Global Hawk UASs. These pre-production Global Hawks
were built by Northrop Grumman for the purpose of carrying reconnaissance payloads. The
vehicles will begin a new life as a supplement to NASA's Science Mission Directorate by
providing a high altitude, long endurance airborne science platform. The vehicle has an 11,000
nautical mile range and 30+ hour endurance at altitudes above 60,000 feet mean sea level
(MSL). NASA's first Global Hawk flight was successfully flown this year. To date, the Project
has flown 5 successful flights, all with NASA 872. NASA 871 is expected to fly its first NASA
flight in the summer of 2010. The first airborne science mission flight is scheduled for Spring
2010.
The Range Safety Office has supported NASA Global Hawk flight planning and risk analysis
tasks in support of FAA Certificate of Authorization (COA) applications as well as real-time
operations support.
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4. Ikhana
NASA's Ikhana UAS is a General Atomics Predator-B modified to support the conduct of Earth
science missions for the Science Mission Directorate. The aircraft is designed to be
disassembled and transported ina large shipping container aboard standard military transports.
The vehicle successfully flew multiple missions in support of acoustic research and one flight to
map post-wildfire damage.
Ikhana has been registered with the FAA and given the tail number N870NA.
The Range Safety Office has supported Ikhana UAS flight planning and risk analysis tasks in
support of FAA Certificate of Authorization (COA) applications as well as real-time operations
·support. The vehicle has flown 14 flights this year with durations lasting as long as 7 hours.
5. Orion
The Orion Project is an element of the Agency's Constellation Program. The Orion Project
consists of the Crew Module (CM) and the Launch Abort System (LAS). Dryden is responsible
for conducting a series of flight tests to demonstrate proper operations of the LAS and CM'
recovery systems in response to abort events initiated on the launch pad and during the initial
ascent phase of flight. The abort flight tests will be conducted at the U.S. Army's White Sands
Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico.
Dryden is currently in the process of integrating the Crew Module test article for Pad Abort 1 test
flight. Dryden will also be responsible for integration of the second Crew Module test article for
Ascent Abort 2 test flight. •
The most significant events of Calendar Year 2009 include the completion of the Pad Abort
Launch facilities, the delivery of the PA-1 Jettison and Abort motors to WSMR in May, and the
delivery of the PA-1 Crew Module to WSMR in August. The jettison motor is a solid rocket
motor designed to separate the LAS from the Crew Module. The abort motor is a solid rocket
motor designed to separate the LAS and Crew Module away from the Ares I launch stack in the
event of a problem on the launch pad or anytime during first stage burn.
The RS Office tailored NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8715.5, Range Safety Program,
for Pad Abort #1 and provided inputto RCC 319, Flight Termination Systems Commonality
Standard tailoring for Ascent Abort #2.
D. Johnson Space Center
1. Constellation Range Safety Panel (LCRSP)
The Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel (LCRSP) manages launch Range Safety matters
for Constellation program vehicles, including specifying key interfaces with the Department of
Defense (DoD) for launch Range Safety.
This section summarizes the work conducted through the LCRSP and its two chartered working
groups.
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a. LCRSP Trajectory Working Group:
The Trajectory Working Group (TWG) was the first sub-group chartered by the LCRSP. The
primary responsibility of the group is to ensure that each Range Safety trajectory analysis
requirement, as specified by the 45th Space Wing (45 SW), is coordinated among the proper
NASA centers.
During 2009, the working group's efforts were focused primarily on the development of the Final
Flight Data Package (FFDP) that was delivered to the 45 SW for the Ares I-X test flight which
launched in late October 2009. The development of the FFDP was a multi-center effort led by
trajectory analysts at Langley Research Center (LaRC). Engineers from Johnson Space Center
(JSC) and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) were also heavily involved, performing the
necessary Verification and Validation (V&V) activities. The TWG served as the primary forum
for coordination with the Eastern Range, as well as the review panel for each of the Ares I-X
FFDP trajectory products. Representatives from the 45 SW were also regular participants in the
working group and provided technical assistance on many occasions.
The following official products were completed and delivered for the Ares I-X FFDP:
• Nominal Ascent and Reentry Trajectories
• 3-Sigma Trajectory Envelopes
• Malfunction Turn Trajectories
• First Stage Impact Location Footprints
• Upper Stage Disposal Footprints
• Sonic Boom and Acoustic Analysis
• Debris Catalog Data
b. LCRSP Probabilistic Risk Assessment Working Group:
The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Working Group was first chartered in early 2007 as
the forum through which all launch vehicle range safety-related reliability analyses and products
would be coordinated for the Constellation Program. This technical forum supports the Launch
Constellation Range Safety Panel in all matters related to vehicle failure probability estimation
for range safety risk assessments in compliance with the requirements of the Constellation
Program, NASA's NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, and applicable Air Force Range Safety
policY,and requirements. The members of the working group include representatives from the
Launch Vehicle Project Office (Ares, Ares I-X), Mission Operations, Safety and Mission
Assurance, and the 45 SW.
In 2009, the working group generated the final Ares I-X probability estimates for all of the
possible vehicle failure modes that were identified by the team. This PRA was finalized and
delivered to the 45 SW as part of the Ares I-X FFDP. The PRA results also contributed towards
the completion of the Ares I-X trajectory analysis tasks by identifying the possible malfunction
turn (i.e., off-course) failure scenarios and listing their relative likelihood. In addition, the PRA
Working Group coordinated with the 45 SW to develop a new methodology for adjusting the
probability estimates for mature systems to account for the inherent risks associated with a new
launch vehicle design. The process to develop these "first flight adjustments" was considered to
be groundbreaking work since previous NASA risk assessments typically involved mature
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vehicles. The work and collaboration between NASA and the 45 SW on this issue will continue
to evolve as new launch vehicles are developed and flown.
The FFDP PRA products were developed by Safety and Mission Assurance personnel at
Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Langley Research Center.
c. Ares & Orion Range Safety Topics:
Throughout 2009, the LCRSP discussed a number of Range Safety topics related to the Ares
launch vehicle and Orion spacecraft. These topics included the following:
• Launch Enterprise Transformation Study (LETS)
• Ares & Orion Debris Catalog Development
• Tailoring of AFSPCMAN 91-710 and NPR 8715.5
• Ares Flight Termination System (FTS) Delay Time / Abort Sequencing
• Ares & Orion Abort Disposal Constraints
This section highlights just a few of the examples of the complex projects and tasks that were
completed by LCRSP participants nationwide. The launch of Ares I-X signified the culmination
of a range safety analysis and development effort that spanned several years and involved
multiple NASA centers and contractor organizations. In the end, 2009 proved to be a very
active and successful year for the Constellation Range Safety community.
2. Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel
In 2009, the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel dealt with a number of topics related to the
Space Shuttle. Included were the Launch/Range Enterprise Transformation Study, the Launch
Collision Avoidance (COLA) Process, the Meteorological System Computer, Command
Receiver Decoder Retest Requirements, Balloon COLA's, and MCLARA Weather Inputs.
a. Launch/Range Enterprise Transformation Study
The Launch/Range Enterprise Transformation Study (LETS) is a proposed major restructuring
of the U.S. Air Force range architectures and processes. Although the proposal will affect all
range users eventually, the effect on the Shuttle Program is limited since the Shuttle program
will end before many of the proposed changes can go into effect.
Since all future launch vehicles will be required to use GPS for range safety functions, a major
component of the LETS architecture is the proposed retirement of many ground-based tracking
radars. Some of these radars would be retired in the near-term, and these retirements could
potentially impact Shuttle launches and landings.
After extensive analysis, the Shuttle Range Safety Panel made recommendations to LETS
regarding which radars should be retained and which should be retired in order to minimize the
impact of LETS on the remaining Shuttle launches. Discussion and negotiation regarding the
impact of LETS on the Constellation Program will continue for some time.
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b. Launch Collision Avoidance (COLA) Process
The year began with an extended discussion of a proposed Air Force Special Instruction
(SPINS) that would have implemented a new Air Force process for prelaunch conjunction and
collision avoidance screening. However, the proposed SPINS was cancelled. Several months
later, the 14th Air Force issued a new draft Air Force Instruction 91-217 which proposed a
similar prelaunch screening process.
That memo was subsequently signed by the Air Force in October of 2009 and will be first
implemented for the launch of STS-130 in 2010. The new process will have 614AOC screen all
launches from the Eastern and Western Ranges based on the Satellite Catalog. For manned
vehicles, they will use either a 200 km sphere, a 200 x 50 x 50 km ellipsoid, or a probability of 1
in 1 million. For active spacecraft and debris, they will use a 25 km sphere or a probability of
greater than 10 in 1 million.
Although the use of the probability method would have provided great benefits for the Shuttle
program, technical difficulties precluded doing so, and remedying those difficulties will not be
possible during the remaining life of the Shuttle program. So, reluctantly, the Range Safety
Panel concluded that volume based screening was the only practicable alternative. After some
analysis based on known Shuttle maneuver tolerances and navigation system uncertainties, the
Range Safety Panel recommended the use of a miss distance of 8 x 30 x 30 km, which would
be equivalent to a probability of 1 in 1 million for Shuttle launches. Although initially receptive to
the use of this Shuttle-specific screening volume, the Air Force later decided to retain the
generic 25 km sphere for screening against all unmanned objects. Subsequently, a letter was
drafted by the Space Shuttle Program Manager to the Air Force requesting the use of the 8 x 30
x 30 km volume. At the end of the year, the Air Force was still considering that request.
c. Meteorological System Computer
The Meteorological System Computer (MSC), which processes balloon data to derive
atmospheric wind profiles, experienced a major failure during the STS-126 launch at the end of
2008. Both prime and backup computers became overloaded and crashed, and some data was
lost while other data was delayed. The MSC system is old and scheduled for upgrade /
replacement in a year or two, but the replacement will not be available during the planned life of
the Shuttle program.
In response, the Shuttle Range Safety Panel helped facilitate the development of a mitigation
plan which would limit the amount of data that the MSC would be asked to process at anyone
time and thus, hopefully, prevent any future crashes. .
The mitigation plan has two parts. The first part attempts to limit the amount of data the MSC
will be asked to process during nominal operations to that which experience shows it can
process without experiencing difficulty. The second part would be invoked if a slowdown is
experienced and would even further restrict processing requests to the minimum necessary to
actually launch.
For the remainder of 2009, no MSC processing anomalies were experienced during any of the
Shuttle launches to the International Space Station (ISS) (i.e., the STS-119, STS-127, STS-128,
and STS-129 launches). The only anomaly was during STS-125, a Hubble Space Telescope
(HST) servicing mission. The longer launch window for the HST mission (approximately one
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hour for HST missions vs. ten minutes for ISS missions) required multiple balloon launches in
order to cover the entire launch window. This led to higher loading than experienced during
typical ISS missions which, in turn, resulted in overloading the MSC and caused a slowdown in
processing.
When this happened, the part two processing restrictions described above were invoked for the
MSC, and, although the processing slowdown did persist for some time, the system did not
crash and was able to process all of the data required for the launch. The system experts
believe that the mitigation plan put into place after STS-126 is the reason that the system did
not crash during the STS-125 count, and that is the plan that will be carried for the remaining
Shuttle launches. '
d. Command Receiver Decoder Retest Requirements
There had been concern that Shuttle Range Safety Command Receiver Decoder (CRD) open-
loop and closed-loop end-to-end tests were not being planned within 6.5 days of the scheduled
launch as expected by the 45th Space Wing (45SW). There was also concern that the
unexpected assembly/checkout operations in the forward skirt after closeout may threaten the
integrity of the Range Safety.System (RSS). The Range wanted to make sure that it was
documented that they had representatives available to verify the integrity of the RSS and
request a retest, if necessary. Recent Shuttle processing experience shows the typical test
planning target is 11 days prior to a scheduled launch. Testing later in the processing flow is
constrained by safety-critical ops such as fuel loading and interface closeout verifications.
Ground ops agreed to move closed-loop tests further from launch to accommodate some of
these processes. Historical data shows that up to 14 days can elapse between S5009 Final
Ordinance Connection arid Closeout operations and the first planned launch attempt.
The 30A90506 specification document will be revised to establish a test planning requirement of
no earlier than 14 days from command closed-loop end-to-end tests to the scheduled launch
date. The document will also be revised to capture a requirement for an ER safety
representative to be present during reentry of the SRB forward skirts to verify the integrity of the
RSS. A general requirement on SRB forward skirt access is being drafted, and a separate
Requirements Change Notice (RCN) will be generated for the 14-day requirement. This will be
combined with the 270-day CRD bench test requirement. All of these changes were approved
by the Shuttle Range Safety Panel.
e. Balloon COLA
A collision between a weather balloon and a Shuttle launch has never been considered a
credible hazard because, A) the weather balloons are seldom blown across the Shuttle launch
trajectory, and B) the balloons are very small and so, overall, the likelihood of a collision is
remote. For that reason, there is no NASA requirement for anyone to do balloon collision
avoidance analysis. Interestingly, however, during the STS-128 launch attempt on August 24,
2009, the Day-of-Launch I-Loads Update group (DOLlLU) observed balloons actually were
being blown back toward the Cape and across the shuttle's trajectory, thus elevating the
possibility of a collision from completely impossible to theoretically possible. It was determined
that the only balloon that could possibly be in the area of the Shuttle track at the time of launch
was the L-1 h25m balloon. Since this balloon was not required in order to launch, and even
though no action was required on their part, the DOLILU group consulted with the Ascent Flight
Director and elected not to launch the balloon in question on that dai
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After the STS-128 launch, the Shuttle Range Safety Panel first received a briefing on the
capabilities of the 45SW to project balloon tracks. It turns out that the 45SW can only project
balloon tracks for balloons that continuously rise. Since the balloons in question top out at
about 60,000 ft., the 45SW cannot project the tracks of those balloons and could not acquire
that capability in time to be of use for any Shuttle launch.
Given this, for all remaining Shuttle launches, the DOLILU group will assess the balloon ground
tracks just as they did during STS-128. If balloon tracks cross the Shuttle ground track, DOLILU
will notify the flight director and adjust the balloon schedule if that can be done without
adversely impacting launch preparations. If they cannot, then the launch will continue since the
remote risk of a collision has already been accepted by the Shuttle program.
f. MCLARA Weather Inputs
In the past, seasonal c1imatalogical data has been used by the Eastern Range (ER) Safety Risk
Analysis Office to assess the risk associated with STS launches. More recently, the Range has
been transitioning to the use of North American Mesoscale (NAM) model forecast data and had
previously implemented the use of NAM data for the computation of risk from toxic gases. For
the last Shuttle launch of 2008, STS-129, the Range was ready to complete the transition and
begin use of NAM data for the computation of debris risk.
KSC personnel initially expressed concern that the use of "forecast" data might result in
instability in the risk calculations and result in the identification of risks too late in the count to
take proper mitigating action. However, 45SW personnel were able to show that the use of
NAM data does produce stable results inside T-84 hours when the transition is made from
seasonal data to NAM output. KSC was reassured by these results, and the Shuttle Range
Safety Panel concurred with the use of NAM data for STS-129.
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rSUMMARY
Range Safety was involved in a number of exciting and challenging activities and events in 2009
involving the development, implementation, and support of range safety policies and
procedures.
Activities included the updating of policy related to flight safety systems and flight safety risk
criteria, including the coordination of a review of our MOA with the 45th Space Wing, up for its
triennial review in February 2009, and the development and implementation of tailored
requirements for the Constellation Program. Range Safety also continued efforts to revise NPR
8715.5, Range Safety Program, to accommodate developments in our evolving discipline, and
is working toward a July 2010 posting.
Range Safety representatives took part in a number of panels and councils, including the Range
Commanders Council (RCC) Rang~ Safety Group (RSG) and its subgroups. NASA also
participa~ed in the RSG with Range Safety representatives from NASA HO, KSC, DFRC, and
Wallops, actively supporting the RSG.
Advancing our effort to provide training at various levels of range safety, a total of 562 students
have participated in 21 Range Safety Orientation Courses. Additionally, NASA and KSC Range
Safety supported 19 launches this year consisting of 4 from the Western Range and 15 from the
Eastern Range, including 5 Shuttle launches and the Ares I-X test launch.
Range Safety also participated in the evaluation of several emerging technologies, including the
Autonomous Flight Safety System for expendable launch vehicles, and the explosive re-siting of
the VAS to support haz~rdous operations for the Constellation Program. The Enhanced Flight
Termination System continues to advance, with the Dryden Flight Research Center/Air Force
Flight Test Center planning to install and test a fixed Enhanced Flight Termination System
transmitter by the end of calendar year 2010. The Joint Advanced Range Safety System also
continues to make progress toward achieving its goal of supporting Unmanned Aerial Systems
and Reusable Launch Vehicles at all ranges.
We hope you found our web-based format for the Range Safety Annual Report to be usable and
informative, and we hope that linking to the original articles has reduced the need for repetition
in this report without sacrificing the quality of the information presented. As we move into 2010,
we look forward to the opportunities and challenges of ensuring the safety of NASA activities
and operations.
Anyone having questions or wishing to have an article included in the 2010 Range Safety
Annual Report should contact Richard Lamoreaux, the NASA Range Safety Program Manager
located at the Kennedy Space Center, or Michael Dook at NASA Headquarters.
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\\'elroml' to tilt' 200Q edition of til(' '\IASA Rang£' Safety Annual R£'porl
Once again we have ulmzed this web-based fom"lal for t e ann al report, We continually
rece e positive feedback on the web-based edition, and we hope you enjoy this year's
prOduct as well
It has been a very busy and productive year liS hopefully you WI no e 101l0"",n9 a review
of h year's report Tank you to everyone whO contributed to make this year a
successful one, and I look forward 10 wooong \'Iuh all ot you in t @ years to come
extPI viousHome
As is the case each year, conll'lbutors 10 Ihis report are too numerous 10 menbon. 001 we
thank i diVlduals from the NASA Centers. the Department of Defense, a d civil" n
organiza'hons for ir cont butions We've made a real ffort to IOclude t e most
curre t Information available We recommend t is report be used only tor guidance and
tha e validity and accuracy of all articles be verified tor upda es
The sections "nelude a program overview and 2009 hig lights. Range Safety Training;
Ra ge Safety Pol cy; Independe As:ressmen s S ppo to Progra Ope lions at all
ran es conducting NASA launch opera ons; a continuing overview 01 emerging range
safely-relaled technologies, and slalus reports fro all of 1 e ASA Cenlers that have
Ra ge Safely responsib~ities,
Welcome to Ihe 2009 edition of tho NASA Ra 98 Safe y Annual Report Funded by
NASA Headquarters, this report provides a NASA Range Sa ety overview for current
a d potential ra ge users T is )'ear, NASA Range Safety trans~loned 0 a conde sed
a nual r1tport 10 allow for Secretarial support 10 the Range Safety Group, Risk
Comm ee In the Mure, traditional annual reports will be vmtten 10 el'e years and
co densed versions wiU be written In O<ld years Altho g uch shorter than in prevIous
yearll, this report contains f II-length a e1es concerning various s bjeet areas, as well
as Ii s to past reports Additionally s mmaries from various NASA Range Safety
Program aetiv! les at took place througho tlhe year are pre~ led as well as
information on several projects I at may ave a profound Impact on e way business
",~II be done in the future
Richard W Lamoreaux
NASA Range Safety Manager
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pr senled to a total of 4 students The scJledule for all ourw. for .010 is depict d in FIgure
below
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Target Audience:
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• Safery, R.ehability, Quahty,. d 'laJl1li1JJ1ablliry !'rofe I nm with an IOteresl IJ1 Range
afety a l1\~ties
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1\. Range S.lfety Tr.lining 2009 Updatl's
T e Range Safety 0 entatIOn Co rse, as outlined in Ig re 3 IS designed to pro e an
understanding of the Range Safety mission. associated poli ' sand requi me Is. and NASA
roles and respo sibillties It !trod ces he stUde Is 10 e major ra ges a d their ca bUllies
defines a d discusses the major elements 01 Range Safet'! (flighl analysis, flight te 'nalion
sysle . and range operations), and bfieOy addresses associated range safely lopics such as
round safety, frequency mEl ageme t. and nrna neel aerial systems (UAS) The course
emphasizes the p 'nciples 01 safely ris managemenllo ensure the public a d NASNra 98
wor1lforces are 0 subjec ed 10 risk of injUry gael' ha th8t of normal day·la-day aelivi jes
The t'OU e IS de I 'ned 10 Ill/arm Ihe au,hellce of" Ihe sen Ice~ 00' red b . the Rallge Safet
orgalllzau0I1, to presenl tllll frames Ihat alloll' adequale Interfa e with Kling afel)' dllIing
ProgramfProject Slanup and d ign in an eftol1 10 ll1inlllllZe potential d lay and costs., and \0
r' ommend ways of making the workmg rchUI(lI1slllp ".th R 1ge afo 1)' beneficial for the R g
U er 1111 C<.)urse Include BV1- JI (0 Ran 'e Safely IBCJl'lIt:<> at ceAFS/K, C and Will normall '
only be presenkxl at the Eastel11 Range If~'O\I \\1sh (0 dl ell S presenting lht' cI sat YOllr
location. please contaclthe (' stall
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Prerequisite· P or attenda ce at NSTC Course 074. Range Safety Orientation. or eqUlvalen
experience
Althoug Ihe course is based on E Vs at e Eastern Ral ge I e overall ana sis process and
concep 5 are also applicable to ot er vehicles and other ra ges he COurse concentrates on
debriS hazartls and analyses but also cI des an 0 erview of IOXIC blast, and radiallon risks
8 d analyses T e course includes class exercises I a cover certain aspec;.Is of the fI ghl
a alysls process
T e R<ilnge FI I Safety An<ilIYSIS 00 rse IS designed 10 91ve the stude I a detail
u derstanding of range safely a atysls As dialled I Figure 4 lh course I cludes NASA
FAA. and DoD requirements for f1tg t s!lfety analysis. 8 I&CUSSlon of ra ge opera 0 hazards,
os, etiteria, a d sk nagement proc sses. and an In-dept covera of the oonlalnmEmt and
lis management analyses performed for expendable launch vehicles (ELY) al the Eastern
Range
Pre~ioliS NextHomegency Rang Saf ty Progra
1\. Range Safety Tr.lining 2009 Updates
2. Range Flight Safety Analysis (SMA·SAFE·NSTC·OO86)
Target AUdience:
• NASA, FAA. and DoD Range Safely Analysis
Range Safely perso el in other disciplines
• l>rogramlproJect managers and et)gmeeJS "'~10 deSIgn pDlennally hazardous systems 10
operate on 3 range
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Pf8reguisites:
Completion of NSTC 074. Range Safety Orientation, or eq ivalent level of experience. or
traini 9, is required
2. Completion of NSTC 002, System Safely Fundamentals or NSTC 008 System Safety
Workshop, recommended
T e Flight Safely Systems (FSS) Course descrmes FSS responsibilihes and Flight Termination
System (FTS) design, est, performance, Implementa on a atysls and doco ntation
r1!lquir menls As d8la~ed In Figur 5, the 00 rs.e also Indudes a review of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) flig ttermination systems, balloon niversal tem-.nation packages. and the
nhanced FlJg t Termination System ( FTS) T e FSS class WIll concl ""th a descriplion of
the A tonomous Righi Safety System (AFSS) and a to r 01 the Naval Ordnance Test Unit
(NOTU) acili jes wtlen the class 15 held a Kennedy Space Cen er
Pre ious NextHomegency Range Saf ty Program
3. Rango Flight Safety Systems (SMA-SAFE-NSTC-0096j
Target Audience.
• NASA, FAA, and DoD Range Safety Personnel working Flighl Safety Systems Ist-ues
Range Safety personnel in ollier di5(:ipli es
Program.'project managers and engineers who design potentially hazardo s systems 10
operate on a range
• Pell. onne! who oondu t hazardous Opel'Jllloru 011 3 ran!;~
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Ithough not being offenild through TC thiS )'ear dll to restricled funding resources., center
Qr otller (,rgani:r.alions may reqll 'I thiS cI 'S Iffund," • i Jl "ided
extPreviousHomegency Range Saf 7 Program
A. Rangt> Safety Training 2009 Upd.ltl'S
4. Range Safety Operations Course (SMA.SAFE-NSTC-0097)
PrerequISItes'
1. NSTC course 074. Range Safety Orientation. or eq ivalent expenence and/or training, and
a background In range safety
2 NSTC-0086, Range Fljg/lt Safety Analysis, or aquivale t expenence and/or training.
3 NSTe-0096, Flight Safety Systems. or eq ivalent expetience and/or lralni g,
To ens Ire m'ssion success and safe operatio s or t e Range. a for al process has evolved
wilhin t e Range corrmunity to pro de a ge Safely operal1ons This oourse addresses lhe
roles and re.sponsfbilities of e Range Safety Officer for Ra ge Safely operations as well as
real-time suppo inel ding pre~aunch, launcl1, flight, re-entry, landing, nd any asso ted
miUgation, Mission rules, oou tdown activi 'es, and display lec niquos are presented
Additionally. tracking, telemetry, a d ve iele characte 's 'cs are covered in de ail. Finally, post
operations lesso s learned, and the use and Importa ee of co tinge cy plans are presented
T ose participati 9 in the course receive ha ds-on training and llxercises to remforce e
instruc iOll It is I portant to note- t a IS course is only presented at WFF (Wallops Flight
acUity) and Is limited to $IX pa Clpan $. The co rse centers on I e topics $ own n Figure 6
below.
Targe! Audience,
Persons identi ed as eeeling inl iallralfling for ture/curre I Job as RSO ",oj NASA or ROO
management
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a. Range Commanders Council Range Safety Group Recap
extPre iousHOUlerogramg ncy Range Saf
B. OeH'lopmt'nt. Implenll'nt.ltiun, Support of Range Safl'ly Policy
2. Range Safety Interface
The 104- RSG conferenoe was hosted by Wallops Flig I Facili y (VVFF) VA, on 14·16 April.
The RSG In cor mitt e. Risk Committee (Re). Fhg IT rmina on Systems Committee
(FTSC). and Directed Energy Ra ge Safety Committee (DERSC) met
For mo backgrou dad Informatio on t Range Commanders Co cil and I e Ra ge
Safe y Gro p click here.
b. 104'" Range Safety Group Conference
The R nge Commanders Council (ReC) was fou ded I 19 1 to provide a way for 000 lest
ranges to commu lcate and discuss coml on prob ems affl!clJ gall I1les Pnor to 2008,
NASA \It S an Assoaale"'e r of e RCC wi re se ta Ives 0 6 of Ihe 14 RCC working
groups NASA became an official voting memb r In J Iy 2008
The RCC Range Safely Gro p (RSG) co Iinues 0 proVide a forum in wtlld! ranges ca
slandard , develop, and Improve on a variety of subjects a d processes relaled to range
safely Range Safety represenla - es from NASA HQ. KSC DFRC. and Wallops actively
support e RSG d ils subcom lees 0 a reg lar baSIS There were lwo ROO meetings in
2009, summarized below.
In the main commiltee, special presentations ""ere made by wallops Fbghl FaCility focusing on
their capabilities and lhe failed AI ia I ec systems {ATK)ALV X- estlaund!. The la .er
pres labon II'lcluded a video of IIle unch These prese tabons were followed by range
reports from ead! range. The next RSG meellng was sched led for J-.S November, 2009 at
China La e CA
am of the 10PIC discussed 10 the I C mcluded lhe I:nhan ed Flight I enmnallon
(EFI ) program pdale d status, EF I recelH'r lesnng re UlremenlS, updating R
Illclude E' reqUiremell1s. and a ubmmJature Flight :lfel) 'stem ( Fe ) update. pe ial
topi . III luded Moog In' pre entation rcgardlllg lCStlllg r 'qUlrcmcnts for h d ulic a 111 tors
and relat,," >SkillS AddJhonaH • Mr Michael ,"oun • of A: DFR(' was eleeled as lhe new
F'! T ChlUrpCI )11
It, 20091\nl1l1.11 Rl'rort
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R. Dl'\'t'lopnwnt, Implt·nwnt.ltiol1, Support of R.ll1gl' 501ft·ty Policy
c. 105 Range Safety Group Confer nee
The 105- RSG conference was hosted by Naval Air Warfa C nter (NAV\C), Chi a a e
C lifomla, 2 November The RSG aln co I 'ee. RC. FTSC and DERSC
~t1 9 was sCheduled for Apnl2010 at Aberdeen Pro 9 Gro no MD
During the RC meeUng, task I ads pr senled bn gs cone rnlng mod I u certainty,
cond ional ris asset protectIOn, aircraft ns I erabi ity, and a Feder I AVlabon Administration
proposal foevs god bris catalogs Tee chair prese te<! a sehed Ie a d way ahead for
completion of all tasks p or 10 t e ext SG in Nove ber 2009 I additio, SA Range
Saf ty voluntee d 0 conduct e secce ariat duties du g I is reVISion cycle
In the RSG main COmml tee, NAWC gave a bnefing on I elr faci i es nd operatIOns whiCh
mel de one of lh alion s largest over1and test ranges WFF also g ve an I -dep
prese tation and discussion 0 the recent discovery of a boat. a rear marsh 'hin the boat
exclUSion area du ng a I unch These Pfese latlO s were followed by t e stan rd activity
reports from each range
ToPICS discussed in the FTSC were nhanced FIIg I TerminatIon System ( FTS)
Implemenlabo at var ous ranges, updallng RCC 319 10 IIldud EFTS requlreme IS, cr allng a
new RCC document ilar to RCC 313 gardlng lest mel odology of EFTS receivers. NASA
and ATK Aulonomous FIIg t S fely Syslems, -3 Cor mun ons electroniC safe and arm
device (in-fine FTSA), and the -3 Communications plans for a Subminiature Frg t Safety
Sys em (SFSS)
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We look forward to 2010 and suppa ng the numerous LV launches at both the
Eastern and Western Ranges. Add. onally we anbcipate supporting five Shu tie
missions
e tPre iou$Home
Rilngl> Silf<'ly Support to PJOgrilnl 0pl'f.1tions
Vandcnb 'rg Air Force BilSC
nited l.lunch Alliean("(' 1),.>ltall
I1x"1<"'1 with' 's Wid Add
Infrared SUf\C' E plo cr, or 1'\'15l:,
~atdlit Jbo.lrd..Re.ld 'lore
NASA and KSC Range Safety supported 19 launches this year: 4 rom the Western
Range and 15 from the Eastern Range (3 ASA sponsored expenda e launch vehicle
launches, 6 non- ASA launches in the Risk Assessme Center,S Sh e lau ches.
and I e Ares I-X test launch)
In order to ensure the require ents of PR 8715.5 are et dUring pre.launch. launch,
and post- launch operations, RS parso lei wo side by Side wit our Depart ent of
Defense counterparts in he astern or VVestern Range Opera ons Control Centers
RS pe onnel ensure any range safely related ac vitles t 1COuld have an impact on
ASA launch cnteria are relayed to the A A Safety and Program offioials to ensure
safe flight and compliance with requirements identified in NASA Ra ge Safety
directives
Click here to view 2008 article.
III. Support to Program Op rat'ons
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As tepa d lasl y ar (see 2008 Att/CkJ) the V hide Asse bly BUilcling (VAB) musl be re-SIIed,
fro n explosive safety perspec: e, to support hazardo s ope ions for e Cons lallon
Program The rrenlO an Ily-Dlstance (00) Sa~ $1 Ing radius for Sh We processing IS s d
on a i g 0 more Iha 6 Reusa e Solid Rockel 0 or (RSRM) seg Is presenl at one
time Plans or Constel tion processing may requi 40 or mo RSRM segments since e
Ar&s I rst slage is xp C1ed to conslsl of 5 se9me ts and A s V boosters y co tain 5 ~
segments each In addi ·on to these potentially explosive co pone ts, t e Orion Service
Mod Ie co Id also be present 10 t e VAS, ~lIf1lch may conlal a f II10a<l of hype ollc liquid
propellants, posslb 10 excess of 19,000 po nds (35% Monol e yl Hydraz e (M H), and
65% Nitrogen Te ro de (NTO)] Since this collectio of dangerous commodities presents a
variety 0 hazards to personnel and $ rro nding faclhtles, a stUdy was I Ilated In 2007 10
evaluate a d do nlthe Maxi um Cre<li e Eve t (MCE) that could be expected from
Sl ul a eous vehicle processing i the VAB
extPr iousHomeechnolog
Since mid-2006, the KSC Safely & Mission Assurance Integra a Office (KSC/SA-G) has led
the overall MCE effort. and KSC Range Sa ety perso el have p yed a s pport role. along with
a large leam of conlnb lors thaI was assembled 10 pursue various portions of 1 Is complex
endeavor. There has been collaboratio and close coordination . Explosive Safety leaders
at KSC and HO-NASA, as well E r1y this year, the ASA Engineering a d Safely Center
( ESC) worapped up a thermal azard study based on t'NO fi e--s gmenl sod molors burning In
one VAB high bay. To ensure a 'NOrst case res • motors WEre assumed stationary with no
structural failure Wo on this boundtng case was s ared by Am s Researc Cen er (ARC),
\MIere Computational FlUid Dynamies (CFD) analyses continue to playa role in ongoing
I ves ations Also involved were he Navy's China ke searc acifily. where thermal
radlallon analysis was conducted Hughes Assoc,ales, Inc , ~lIf1ere h ma bum ,"jury modeling
was performed; ATK Space Systems, \MIO manufacI res the RSRM segments and other solid
motor h rdware; a <1 he KSC E Ineenng DeSIgn & Develop~ t Office (KSCI N -D), wtllet\
provided focused techn cal and PfojeC1 nagement s fVlC8S A detaiJed analysis of exhaust
gas convec fO • radiation. and throug .the se conducllon mdiea ed that assembled solid
motors In at er high bays would likely not be Igni ed due 10 ermal transpor1 ~m e burning
motor pair As a resul the largesl hazard rad-us due to thermal radiation beyond a ming
exhaust plume was es' a ed 10 be slig t1y smaller an the e s ng Shuttle aD rc (1310 fee)
Traditional aD Si g Implemented using table lookup agal st a total weigh of poten Ily
explOSIVe lonal, IS inlended to account for general blast a d fragmentation hazards, as well
as Ihermal e ects associated with a fireball. More speci c hazards 10 be considered under the
Me approac Include acous e energy and toxle malenals in and 6rou d the VAS (commonly
referr d 10 as 'near-field toxic hazards).
I
R. \".\8 HJ7ard AI1JI~Sl'S for (onsft>II.1tion Pmn,.,sing
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FIGURE 10: VAS HAZARD ANALYSIS CATEGORIES
Fig re 10. below. allempls 10 illustrate IS array of relevant azards a d their rela 0 ships to
a ~CE. IHA, and NPR 87 5 3C ( ASA Ge ral safety Program Req Ire nts, C ange 3)
Note t at hazards Inside Ihe VAS (rig t half of diagram) ave bee distingUished from hazards
outside (lel1 al of diagram) s nee the Clrc msta ces a d correspo dmg analYSiS methods often
differ so, propulslWl hazards outside the VAS are $ own In a li9 let S Eld beCause they
ay eventually be analyzed and doctlme ted separate from the p "mary IHA.
In addition to the safe siting activity, wtn<:h e.stabhshes logistical co trot boun ry,ASA
reg la IonS So require t at all potential azards be InveslJgaled 0 detem-. e if reaso able
j "galio s are warranted. Additional hazards 10 be re ewed u der an Integraled Hazard
Assessment (I ) include structural fall res a d po.sslble coli pse, prop Is e components that
could break ff e of restraints, and toxic clouds II a co Id be transported by the \ dad sell
to Ihe gro nd at considerable distances fro the VAS (com nly referred to as 'far-field' toxic
ha a s)
Pr viou
• S.U<tIFol
.)10.""", Ihdy
_.........
weJlh
Hom!!
Applies 10 Mlssi"" fss_i1
Pen Ilulde Ille VAB
echnology
APllllM 10~"""Ml"'d
F llllle:s OOltslduhe VAB
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By ffild-2009, e Ares V boosler con 9 ration had changed from 5 10 5 ~ RSRM se nls,
and I e KSC learn decided 0 ass two 4 l-i-segment open s1acks bu Ing whi e anchored in
one Igh bay PreYlO $ \helTl'lal analyses were per10rmed assummg slallon ry ~seg nl
capped molors forW'Orst-case estimalion purposes. T e 010 credible eve Is were determined
10 involve adve ent Ignition of. at most, two n(;.lipped sla s since ey W'Ould genera e
Ii 'Ied propulsIVe forces. Con 'derallo wi be ven 10 ig Ilio propagation between boosters
~ 'Ihin a single bay and potential spreading 10 olher bays 'I i the VAB Several other ignition
caSeS II be considered wIlie would Involve lesser amol,f s of propel a ~Ylthln a bay or al
other locallo s such as Ihe Tra sfar Aisl CFD ana sas were sum d al ARC v.,lh an Inillal
emp asis on bay-to-b y igni 'on propaga
extPr viousHomeechnology
B. \AR H,17ard Analysl'" for { on .. tl'II.1tion Processing
ATK was asked 10 examine radia 'on effects and thro gh-Ihe-case eat transfer as well as
ignition en eria and t e fikehhood of deflagra 10 when Igni 0 ooc rs at t e outer propellant
I Ie ace wilh t e liner and ins lalion layers ue to resource II a Ions at ARC, SAIC was
bro ght in 10 perform CFD analyses extending well outsIde the VAB walls a d to evaluate
the J radiation effects on person el beyond the nsing ex aus1 pi me TheIr CfD output will
also be us@d by ACTA, Inc an Air Force and NASA Range Safety conlrac or, 10 evaluale near-
field and far-field toxic hazards, II is poss'ble Ihalt e rgest dis1ance to a safe near eld
conce Iratlon level could become I e driver for MC purposes
ACTA has also performed verIfication of blast and fragme a 0 ana es. conducted onginally
by Englneenng Associales Inc (EAI) and rna aged by e KSC Conslellahon Project Ground
Systems 0 fice (KSCI LX·D), EAt's work is largely directed IOViard the design of hazard
IllI 'gations in lhe VAB Such facility upgrades might include e addi ion of olad "ng 0 selected
walls and protectIVe gales (or doors) to enclose hypergol processing caUs, Some of EAl's
oulputs have also been used to suppan azard radi s delerminalion. After confirming the'r
fundamental res tis. ACTA ex:panded on Ihe EAI approach and has begun generating
comprehensive estin les of maximum Injury dlslances defined by fragment density and kinetic
energy Blast azard radii are generally slier than ragmenlation d and do not typically
drrve the aD arc. 1\ should be noted al ACTA WIll be applying t elr expertise In lox cs
modeling and using exisling Range Safety software to estimale dispersion effects in FY2010,
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R. \A8 H.17ard Analyst,s for Con ..tl,II.1tion Pron>ssing
Last , e KSC aunctl Vehicle ProceSSI g Constellalton Opera 0 s »c (t<SCI PH-C) has
bee work 9 wil ATK and structural SI lallon experts al ARC to Investigate haurds posed
by potentially propulsive compo ents, as well as e feil re a d pOSSible collapse 0 structural
elements How 10 g after n inadverte t Ignlho would iii f Ily stacked nd pped RSRM break
free and begm riSing off the Mobfle Launch Platform ( lP)? How much speed could il b ~d up
before im c ng an overhead crane or the VAS S b-roof? Is ere eno g kine 'c energy and
structural 10 gh ess 10 perforale the roof slab and continue nYI 9 outside the bu~ding? Coold
heal generated by bum' 9 motors or partially sacked seg nls cause t e MlP, elevated
structures or load·bea ng beams inside t e VAS to fall? These Quesllons and 0 ers ere bel 9
considered by this leam, 1M'lich inel des KSCINE-D and a KSC Range Safely eng'neer
Answers 'i>1l1likely take an additional two or more years to achie e
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5. Agency Activities
Previous NedHome
.-\. Kl'nnl'dy Sp.lCl' ("l'nl('1
4. Eastern Range Launch Support
In 2009. e KSC Range Safety Representative began proViding la noh s pport for non-NASA
Eastem Range mis 'ons. Serving as the liaison betwee the 45th Space VVing Safety Office
Ris Assessment Genter and the K5e Emergency Operations Ce er (EOC), the K5e Range
Safety ortic evaluated and interpreted rang safety risks to KSC personnel and proporty due to
CCAFS launches and suggested m' iga 'on actions when appropriate In this capacity, the KSC
Range Safety Repre$8ntative supported the GO S·O, GP$ 2R-21, PAN, IN ELSAT 14. a d
WG8-3 missions
The KSC ange Sal ty Repre'sentahve also provltled con ,n ed scupport to he Shuttle Range
Safely Panel and support d all the above listed Sh llle lau ches 0 consote i the Morrell
Opera ions Center ( OC)
3. Launch Services Program
The KSC ,mge Sa Iy Representative supported a nu r of NASA expe (ICll)Ie launch
vehicle campaigns for teLa nch Service Program (LSP). I clud n9 O.M- Prime, oeo,
KEPLER, 5 58-ATRR. lRO S 58-DEMO, and WISE hiS effort mvolved attending aLI he
NASA Clnd AIr oree Safely readiness reviews, enscun 9 P q Irements were being mel.
and identifying, documenting, and obtaining acceptance/approval of a y va ances during t e
respective prelaunc and launch co ntdowns.
Launch and entry risk estimat.es were evaluated for ST8-119, S 8-125, ST8-127, STS.128,
and STS·129, with mitiga 'on e 0 5 in' iated through the KSC Emerge cy Ope tions Center
wtIen appropriate
The KSC Range Safety Representative served as a NASA point of contact to the Range Safety
Gro p and supported seve I committees Co arged with veloptng or reWl1ting nationWIde
standards on a numbttr of Important range safety Issues Thes topics incl dad developing
reusable la ch vehicle and unman ed aerial vehicle snd system req Irements, and proposed
reqwemenlS for active satellite Clod cataloged orbital debris CollISion Avoldanoe The KSC
Range Safety Representative was also active in the developme t of a proposed policy for the
future use of llutonomous ffight 5 fety systems within NASA K5C IS closely monitoring the
status and AFSPC-proposed dacon mlssiooing of Eastern and Western Range ground tracking
and command assets through their Future Range Architecture Team.
. Status R ports
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FIGURE 13: IRVE
3. Sounding Rocket Program
extPreviou!IHome
Inflatable heat shields hold promise for future planetary mIssions. according to researchers To
land more mass on Mars at higher surface elevations. for inslance, mission planners need to
maximize the drag area of the entry system he larger the diameter of the aeroshell, the bigger
the payload can be
he Inflatable Re-entry Vehicle Experiment, or IRVE, was vacuum-packed into a 15-'nctl
diameterylO;l(l "shroud" and launched on a s all so (ling rocket from NASA's Wallops
Flight Facility on August 17, 2009 Itrogen in aled the 1O-foot (3 m) diameter heal shield,
de 0 severnllayers of silicone-coated i dus1JiaI ab ·c. 0 a mllshroo shape in space
seve-ral !nutes after liftoff
The So Inding Rockel Program cond cted 16 missions in 2009 with an overall mission success
e of 100%.
. Status R ports
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FIGURE 14: SU RISE 1-METER BALLOO TELESCOPE READY FOR LAUNCH,
ESRA GE JUNE 2009
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4. Balloon Program Office
The Balloon Prog m Offi¢e al Wallops light acility conducted 13 I I$SIO s during seal year
2009 Fliglt opera ions were co ducted from Fort Sum er, New'Me~ico, McMurdo, Antarctica,
and KiN 5, Sweden in support a Space and Ea h science payloads as well 5S developmenlal
test ig Is for new balloon design and balleo fib q allficallon Right durations ranged from 4
hours to 54 days with the longest ight ocC1Jrring over Anlarctica on the 7 million cubic foot
volume S\lper press re t.es 'ighl.. T e Balloon Progra 0 Ice can inued he Ultra Long
Dura 0 Balloon (ULDB) yehicle developn nl Test nights of larger scale designs of the ULDB
s per pressure balloon is planned for 201 O. he balloon is bei 9 developed to provide
eJctended duratio mhis upwards of eO-lOa days at constant nOal al'1ud8$ The 6alloon
Progra plans to conduct remote campatg s fro McMurdo, A tarcllca, Allee Springs,
Australia: and Fort Sumner, New exico
. Status Reports
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This s Cbon summarizes the work conducted through I e LCRSP and lis two chartered working
groups
The Lau ch Constellation Range Safety Panel (LCRSP) mages launc R nge Safety matters
for Co siellabon program vehicles, Including speafymg key IOterf~ces wi1h the Departmen1 of
Defense (000) for launch Range Safety.
extHome
O. Johnson Span' Cl'ntl'f
1. Constellation Range Safety Panel (LCRSP)
a. LCRSP Trajectory Working Group:
The Trajectory Working Group (TWa) was the rsl sub-group chartered by the LCRSP T e
primary responsibility of the group is to e sure that each Ra ge Safely 1rajf!'ctory analysis
requireme • as specified by the 45'" Space \i'tI\ng (45 SW) IS coordi ated among the proper
NASA centers.
The following official prod cts were completed and deijvtlred for the Ares I-X FFDP':
• Nominal AS(;ent and Reenlry Trajectories
• 3-5igma Trajectory Envtllopes
Malfunction Tum Trajectories
• First Stage Impact ocation FOO1prlnt$
Upper Stage Disposal FootpJints
• Sonic Boom and Acoustic Ana sis
• Debris Catalog Data
During 2009, the worl<:lng group's efforts were focused primanl)' on the development of the Final
Flight Data Package (FFDP) lhal was delivered to the 45 SW for the Ares I-X Issl ffil'lhl which
launched in late October 2009. The de elopment of the FFDP was a mul' center effort led by
trajectory analysts at Langley Research Center (LaRC) ng neers from Johnson Space Center
(JSC) and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) were also hea 'Iy involved, pelforming the
ne<:essary Verifiea 'on and Valida 'on (y&V) actlvi ies. The 'NG served as the primary forum
for coordination \OII1h the Eastern Range, as well as the review panel for each of Ihe Ares ,-X
FFDP trajectory products. Representativtls from the 45 SWwere also regular participants in the
working group and provided technical assistance on ma yoccasions
. Status Reports
http://kscsma.ksc.nasa.gov/Range_Safety/Annual_Report/2009/MainScreen/MainScene.html 2/23/2010
MainScene Page 1 of 1
·11 2009 Annual Rt'port
The FFDP PRA produc1s were develop d by Safety and Mission Assurance personnel al
Johnson Space Center, Marsha I Space Flight Center, and Langley Research Center.
extPreviousHOlne
LCRSP Probabilistic Risk Assessment Working Group.
O. Johnson Span> Cl>nt~'1
In 2009, the wor1<.ing group generated the final Ares I·X probability esti tes for all of the
possible vehicle failure modes thai W&r8 Iden "ned by e learn This PRA was nnallzed and
del' red to the 45 SW as part of t e Ares I·X FFDP The PRA results also contributed towards
the comple on of the Ares I-X trajectory analysis tas s by Identifying the possible malfunction
tum (i.e.• Off-course} fallur-e scenarios an<1llsling their rela veil 'elil ood. In addition, the PRA
Working Group coordinated with the 45 SW to develop a new methodology for adjusting the
probability estimales for mature syslems to accounl for the Inherent risks associated Y.ith a new
launch vehicle design. The process to deY'elop these "first nig t adjustments" was considered to
be grou dbreaking wor1<. since previous SA risk assessments typically i volved mature
vehides The work and collaboration belW en NASA and I a 45 SWon lhis Issue will continue
to evolve as new launch vehicles are developed and nown.
T e Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Working Group was If'St charter d In early 2007 as
the forum through \""ich all launch ve iole range safety-related reliabir analyses a d products
would be coordinated for Ihe Conste labo Program T IS techOical forum s pports the Lau ch
Constellation Range Safety Panelln all mat el'S re tad to vehicle fai re probability estimalio
for range safety risk assessments in comp5ance wi h e requirements 0 e Constella on
Program. NASA's NPR 8715,5, Range Safety Program a d applicab Air Force Range Safety
policy a d require nts The mer bers of t e workng 9ro p indude representatives from the
La ch Vehide Projec Office (Ares. Ares I.X) ~ Iss ion Operations Safety an(l Misslo
Assura ce, a d the 45 Sw.
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Throughout 2009, the LCRSP discussed a n mber of Range Safety topics relaled to the Ares
laune vehicle and Orion spacecraft These topics In ded he lollovllng
Launch Enterprise Transformaiion 51 dy (LETS)
• Ares & Orion Debns Catalog Developm I
• Tailoring of AFSPC 91·710 a d PR 87155
• Ares Flight Termination System (F 5) Delay Time JAbort Sequencing
• Ares & Orion Abort DispO$\'l1 Constraints
c. Ares & Orion Range Safety Topics:
This section hlg lights just a ew of the examples 0 he com ex projects and tasks that were
completed by LCRSP participants nationwide. The launch of Ares I-X signified the culmnalion
of a range safety analysis and development effort thai spanned several years and involved
mul pie NASA centers and contractor organizatlO s, In t e end, 2009 proved to be a very
aclive and successful year for the Constellalio Ran98 Safety community
. Starns R ports
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Ac' ies included thepdating of policy related to flight salety systems and flight safety risk
crite 'a. ,ndud, g he coordi ation of a review of our MOA with the 45th Spa~ 'Mng. up for its
triennial re &w in FebrualY 200Q. a d lhe develo nt and Implementat 01 0 tailored
reqUiremen s for the Constellation Program. Ra ge safety also 00 tinued effor1s 0 revise NPR
8715 5 Ra ge Safety Program, 10 accommodate developme ts in our evol 9 discipline. and
is working toward a July 2010 posting
Ran e Safely was InvOlved in a number of excIting and ohallenging activltles and events i
involving the development. implementation, and suppor1 of range safety policies and
procedures
Range Safety representatiws took part '1'1 a number of pa els and councils ndudi 9 the Range
Command rs Council ( CC) RanQe Safety Group (RSG) and Its subgroup'S SA also
pBr1icipaled in he RSG with Range Safety represen a ves from NASA HQ, KSC, DFRC, and
Wallops, a ..-ely suppor1ing the RSG
Advancing our ef ort 10 provide training at vario sieve of range safety, a total of 562 students
have r1icipated in 21 Range Saf Iy 0 entation Courses, Additionally. ASA and KSC Range
Safely supported 19 launches this year consisting 01 4 from the \Nestem Range and 15 from the
astern Range. including 5 Shuttle launches and the Ares I-X test launch
Range Safely a 0 pal'1iQpa1ed in the evaluation of several emerging teohnologies. including the
Autonomous Fbght Safety System for x,pe dable launch vehicles, and t e ex.ploslve re--siting of
the VAS to suppor1 hazardous operations for the Constellation Program. The Enhanced Ffight
TellTlination System continues to advance. wit the Dryden Flight Researc Center/Air Force
Flight Test Cenler planning to I stag and tesl a ed nhanced Fllg I Termlna on System
transmitter by the end of calendar year 2010. The Joint Advanced Range Safety System also
001'1 nues to make progress toward ac""eving its goa1 of supporting Unmanned Aerial Systems
and Reusable Launch Vehides at all ranges
We hope you found our web-based format for the Range Sa ely Annual Report to be usable and
infollTlative, and we hope that linking to the original ar1icles has reduced the need for repetition
in this report without sacrificinglhe quality of Ihe infollTlation presented. As we move into 2010,
we look forward to lhe opportUnities and challenges of ensuring the safety of NASA activities
and operations.
Anyone having qu&stions or wishing to have an article included in the 2010 Range Safety
Annual Repor1 should conlact Richard Lamoreaux, the NASA Range Safety Program Manager
located at Ihe Kennedy Space Center, or ichaelOoo at ASA Headquarters.
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